The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists Without proper guardrails in place, experts and governments worry, artificial intelligence (AI) could make it easier for more people to do harm with biology. Perhaps advanced chatbots could help devise a biological attack plan, or they could de-skill the process of making a pathogen to the point at which many could do it. Maybe an AI could help develop new toxins. One critical chokepoint to preventing this misuse, experts say, is the synthetic gene industry. Numerous companies have emerged in recent years to fulfill orders for synthetic DNA. Once difficult to make, the genetic blueprint for life can now be purchased online. And while synthetic genetic sequences have many uses in medicine, the life sciences, and other fields, they could also be useful in a less desirable area: bioweapons.
But just how susceptible the gene synthesis industry is to misuse remains an open question. Many companies screen customers to judge their suitability for handling the synthetic material as well as orders to determine if they correspond to the genetic sequences of dangerous toxins or pathogens. To help shore up any gaps, the White House issued an executive order on AI last fall that calls for the government to develop ways to stress test these screening systems.
But in the meantime, researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) conducted their own “red team” test of industry safety measures, arriving at what they characterize as an alarming conclusion. They were able to order and receive all the genetic material necessary to recreate the 1918 pandemic influenza virus and the toxin ricin. “Our results demonstrate that nearly all DNA synthesis screening practices employed in October of 2023 failed to reject lightly disguised orders that could be assembled to produce viable select agents, including a pandemic virus,” the team wrote.